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Abstract
The Air Force currently suffers from excessively high attrition rates in the
cyberspace career. The field is currently aiming to develop an entrance examination for
the career, striving to improve personnel selection and decrease these high attrition rates.
The attribute of suspicion is a key focus of the preliminary examination development,
theorizing that it is a potential indicator present among competent cyber operators. This
research makes use of the Suspicion Propensity Index (SPI), a reliable measure of one’s
tendency to be suspicious, along with the highly cited Mayer’s trust questionnaire in
order to compare the attributes that appear in successful cyberspace individuals compared
to those with no cyber experience. These measures are analyzed in comparison to a cyber
mission performance questionnaire, adapted to assess each participant’s cyberspace
capabilities. The three aforementioned questionnaires were distributed to two distinct
populations: a group of experienced cyber operators averaging 22.8 years in the career
field and a group of Airmen from various career fields with no prior cyber experience.
The research yields evidence that suspicion levels are significantly correlated to
cyber mission performance scores among both the cyber and non-cyber populations, with
cyber operators demonstrating higher overall levels of suspicion than those of non-cyber
operators. Years of experience displays a more prominent effect on the suspicion levels
of cyber personnel, with the non-cyber sample population displaying more constant levels
of suspicion despite time in the Air Force. This evidence suggests that cyber operators
gain suspicion over time in comparison to their non-cyber counterparts. The trust
questionnaire scores were significantly correlated to SPI scores. However, results of the
trust questionnaire do not appear to provide a prediction of cyber mission performance.
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RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL CYBERSPACE WARRIORS THROUGH THE USE
OF SUSPICION PROPENSITY INDEX
I. Introduction
1.1 General Issue
As war fighting in the cyber domain rapidly evolves, the Air Force must be equipped
with the finest airmen capable of innovating technology, techniques, tactics, and procedures to
continually improve the United States’ offensive and defensive capabilities on a global level.
Innovation in the cyber domain is critical to fulfill the Air Force’s mission and to pursue
excellence in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. Despite the Air Force mission’s emphasis
placed in the cyberspace domain, this area lacks the same personnel selection, training, and
structural foundation as the companion domains of air and space.
To maintain dominance in the air, the Air Force carefully selects well-equipped pilot
candidates from Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments, Officer Training School,
and the country’s service academies. Candidate Pilots are held to strict standards and must meet
multiple qualifications before being considered eligible for the career field. For example, they
must have a minimum education of a bachelor’s degree with a grade point average greater than
2.5 and obtain certain scores on the pilot portion and pilot-navigator portion of the Air Force
Officer Qualifying Test (U.S. Air Force). Pilot training is rigorous, multiple years long, and
therefore expensive to conduct for each pilot trainee. Yet this in-depth training is necessary to
ensure that the United States is equipped with the finest airmen to conduct specific operations.
Select individuals within this career field are engaged to refine future techniques, tactics and
procedures, as well as provide guidance to the acquisition community to evolve technical
capabilities.
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Airmen selected for careers in the space field are also carefully selected, as the field
requires a basic background knowledge of space warning and control systems. Space Operations
Officers are required to have the minimum education of a bachelor’s degree in a science,
technology, engineering, or math (STEM) discipline, while enlisted Space Operators are required
to have at least 15 college credits in a STEM field along with meeting certain scores on the
electrical component of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test (U.S.
Air Force). In addition to the background requirements for knowledge in the field,
Undergraduate Space Training is a rigorous six-month program and is only the foundation for
additional system-specific training that must be completed.
While the Air Force strives to dominate in air, space, and cyberspace, there is a clear
dissonance between the qualifications for the cyber field in comparison to the other two domains.
Dissimilar to the air and space components, the cyber component lacks the strenuous prerequisite
demands and does not necessitate any rigid credentials before entering the field. The cyber
career field also suffers from extremely high attrition rates during training activities, highlighting
it as one of the Air Force’s top manning priorities in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Losey, 2018). These
attrition rates have brought attention to the field in hopes of meeting the increasing quotas for
cyber airmen and their likelihood to remain in the field.
One potential option for the Air Force is to enhance the selection criteria for cyberspace
airmen, consequently boosting the knowledge that individuals must obtain prior to entering the
field. However, individuals with prerequisite computer science skills are in high demand within
both the civilian and government realms. Computer engineering holds one of the highest paying
starting salaries for students graduating with a college degree (Somers & Moody, 2019). The
financial incentives associated with careers in this field may be one of the reasons that the
2

number of computer science bachelor’s degrees has risen by 74% since 2009 (Hambrusch,
2017). While the number of graduates who are competent in the realm of computer science and
computer engineering is growing, so is the industry’s need for individuals with this skillset. This
demand makes it critical for the Air Force to carefully balance the Human Systems Integration
domains of personnel, manpower, and training when considering which airmen are best fit for
the cyber career field.
As cyber selection currently operates, a large number of commissioned and enlisted
Airmen are assigned to the field to cushion the high attrition rate. This reduces the average
workforce cost as it relieves the Air Force from paying above market salaries to entice a smaller
number of more experienced, highly educated, cyber personnel. However, by accepting Airmen
who require greater amounts of training to prepare them to be successful operators in the cyber
field and make them mission-ready, training costs are increased. If selection criteria was more
stringent for the field as a whole, fewer individuals should wash out of training, it may be
possible to enhance the quality of the training, and it is possible that a lesser number of highly
capable individuals, as opposed to larger groups of less capable individuals, would be needed to
execute the Air Force’s cyber needs. Figure 1 is a causal loop diagram displaying the balance
between the different considerations in respect to the cyber field. To choose the optimal quantity
and quality of individuals in the career field, many interconnected factors must be taken into
consideration. Manpower is made possible by material support and the cost of retaining the
number of individuals in the field. It in turn affects the cost of personnel, which forms a cyclical
pattern by affecting retention costs. Experience in the cyber field is another consideration that
plays a role in the cost of personnel, along with selection criteria which also affects the cost and
quality of training.
3

Figure 1. Causal Loop Diagram for considerations for the selection process of individuals into the cyber career field.

To properly select individuals with a predisposition for success as cyber operators, one option is
the development of an entrance examination for the career field. This examination could be
extremely beneficial to filter out individuals who lack the foundational attributes that are needed
within the field, along with identifying those who are prone to success.
The use of an entrance examination for specific career fields in the Air Force is a practice
that has been successfully instilled throughout many career fields. The Air Force Officer
Qualifying Test (AFOQT) is used in combination with the Pilot Candidate Selection Method
(PCSM) to identify qualified candidates for flying career fields such as pilot, air battle
management (ABM), and combat systems officer (CSO). The AFOQT is particularly beneficial
for officers seeking to go into the rated career field with no prior flying experience. In a 2013
study, of 139 Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Training students who took the
PCSM and AFOQT prior to beginning training, the scores exemplified good predictive validity
4

(AFOQT r = 0.378, PCSM r = 0.48) for determining completion of the undergraduate training
(Carretta, 2013). Thus, individuals who were successful on this initial examination were
significantly more likely to successfully complete training than individuals who were not
successful on this examination. This study portrays the importance of selecting individuals with
little to no experience based on their propensity for success in the career field. To implement a
similar examination for the cyber career field, testing categories should aim to screen for cyberpropensity as opposed to exclusively testing for current cyber knowledge.
In addition to rated career fields, certain jobs requiring fluency in foreign language use
quantitative measures to gauge an individual’s fitness for these career fields. The Defense
Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) is used for individuals who are already fluent in a foreign
language which is needed for current military operations. As the test is currently scored, a
person’s language proficiency is measured on a scale of zero to three with three being the
highest. However, a newer version of the DLPT is being developed that will include a scale from
zero to five. Another proficiency exam includes the Defense Language Aptitude Battery
(DLAB), which measures one’s aptitude for learning a specific language. This is more
commonly used for individuals who are not currently fluent in a language that is needed by the
Department of Defense (DOD), but who are seeking a job that requires this skill. To develop a
DLAB similar entrance exam for the cyber career field, the Air Force must first understand
exactly what traits and characteristics make an individual more adept for cyber operations.
This requirement has been recognized by the Air Force and has resulted in the generation
of a need for additional exploration. This research is being conducted in response to the topic
“Recognizing Potential Cyberspace Warriors” within the Air University Prioritized Research
5

Topics within the Cyber category. The research discussed in this thesis attempts to help foster an
entrance examination, which is claimed to be under preliminary development through the
addition of a questionnaire focused on understanding the propensity of a person to be suspicious.
Cyber operators are required to install and support cyber systems, along with ensuring their
proper operation and protection from outside intrusion. The preliminary belief that suspicion is a
helpful attribute within the cyber career field stems from the tendencies of suspicious personnel.
Suspicion allows individuals to recognize unusual items or actions in specific situations, while a
natural tendency towards curiosity allows suspicious individuals to elicit information and surveil
for potentially threatening actions. If an individual is naturally inclined to be suspicious and
prone to act upon these tendencies, they may be able to bolster cyber capabilities by maintaining
safe and secure operations. The overall objective of this research is to assist in the Air Force’s
development of the entrance examination. This research aims to reveal insightful information
regarding how suspicion correlates with successful operators in the cyber field.
1.2 Problem Statement
The Air Force cyber career field lacks a field-specific entrance examination for its officer and
enlisted airmen. This lack of a screening process is partially responsible for the field’s suffering
from high attrition rates and low retention among its personnel. If the career field could determine
specific attributes that are correlated with success as a cyberspace warrior, it may help reduce
washout rates and develop a more effective cyberspace domain in the Air Force as a whole. The
long-term objective of the current work is to create a screening tool, aiming to reduce washout
rates and increase retention in the cyberspace domain, thus saving manpower and training dollars
for the United States Air Force.

6

1.3 Research Objectives
In consideration of the cyber environment and the actions which take place within the cyber
domain, both human performance and hardware/software performance compromise the overall
system performance. While a vast amount of research is constantly being conducted to improve
technological capabilities, research is sparse regarding which attributes affect the human operator
while conducting cyber operations. This research will investigate suspicion, aiming to identify its
contribution to operator performance in the cyber field. It will also investigate trust as a potential
inverse characteristic of suspicion.
As it is currently accepted, suspicion is a state attribute that is affected by individual differences
of the perceiver. Recent studies have revealed that for a person to enter a state of suspicion, the
individual is first aroused by a specific trigger within her or his environment. This cue is then
interpreted by the individual in regard to their specific personality traits and propensity to be
suspicious. If the individual is sufficiently aroused, he or she will enter a suspicious state (Bobko
et al., 2014). It has been recently concluded that at different situational levels, individual
personality differences are responsible for either inhibiting or catalyzing this state of suspicion
(Khazon, 2016).
A suspicious state is one that produces uncertain feelings in regard to the individual’s
environment, a feeling of malicious intent towards the trigger that is responsible for the suspicious
state, along with cognitive activity such as indications of stress, perceived increase of cognitive
load, and heightened emotional arousal (Khazon, 2016). For example, a cynical individual will
interpret the suspicion of a situation differently than that of a person who holds great faith in
humanity.
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Another potential individual trait that may affect suspicion is the predisposition for trust and/or
distrust. As suspicion relies partially on one’s uncertainty in a situation, a predisposition for trust
has the potential to increase levels of certainty within a specific context. Contrarily, distrust may
act as a catalyzing factor for an increase in suspicion (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011).
This research posits that one’s propensity for the attribute of suspicion will yield a relevant
correlation with mission performance in the cyber career field. State suspicion propensity is
defined as “a person’s simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and perceived
malintent about underlying information that is being electronically generated, collated, sent,
analyzed, or implemented by an external agent” (Bobko, Barelka, Hershfield, 2014). This research
will aim to measure the attributes of an individual’s propensity for suspicion, perception of
malintent, uncertainty of information, and the engagement in cognitive activity associated with
generating meanings for possible information in relation to his or her experience and expertise in
the cyber career field. This research will also aim to determine whether individuals who have been
successful in the cyber career field will exhibit a greater propensity for the attribute of suspicion
than members of other career fields in the Department of Defense.
As the characteristic of suspicion is proving to be a prevalent area of focus in the field of
cyberspace operations, an objective of this study is to investigate the means in which an enhanced
understanding of how suspicion’s role amongst cyber operators could assist in the development of
an effective screening tool for entrance to the career field. Through a number of surveys and
questionnaires, this research aims to explore how the information collected on current members of
the cyber career compares to the same information gathered from their non-cyber counterparts
with the aim of providing insight into whether the Air Force and military at large should explore
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measures of the characteristic of suspicion and trust to assist in their selection process for future
cyber warriors.
1.4 Research Questions
The following research questions (RQ) will be investigated throughout this study:
•

1.4.1 (RQ-1): Is an individual’s level of suspicion correlated to her or his success within
the cyberspace career field?

•

1.4.2 (RQ-2): Do current Air Force cyber operators differ in their levels of suspicion when
compared to members of other career fields?

•

1.4.3 (RQ-3): Does an Airman’s years of experience in their field correlate to significant
differences in levels of suspicion?

•

1.4.4 (RQ-4): Does an Airman’s propensity to trust correlate with both her or his levels of
suspicion and success within the cyberspace career field?

1.5 Research Hypotheses
The following research hypotheses (RH) were developed in relation to the research questions:
•

1.5.1 (RH-1): An individual’s scores on the SPI and the Mission Scenario questionnaire
will yield a positively correlated relationship. Those who score high on the SPI will also
do well on the Mission Scenario Questionnaire, and vice versa.

•

1.5.2 (RH-2): Suspicion levels and career field are not independent, thus cyber operators
will yield higher SPI scores in comparison to members of other career fields.
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•

1.5.3 (RH-3): Years of experience will have a positive correlation to an individual’s SPI
score. This correlation will be stronger within the cyber career field than that of other
career fields.

•

1.5.4 (RH-4): Trust questionnaire scores will yield a negative correlation with both an
individual’s SPI score and her or his Mission Scenario questionnaire score.

1.6 Research Focus/Scope
Within the realm of this study, cyber operators were expected to exhibit higher levels of
suspicion than airmen of other career fields, as well as exhibit increased levels of suspicion with
increased experience. Trust was also expected to display a negative relationship with both
suspicion and cyber performance. These hypotheses have the potential to significantly impact the
selection process for operators entering the cyber career field. The identification of suspicion and
trust as traits potentially correlated to the predisposition for success in cyber operations has the
capacity to assist the Air Force in screening individuals entering the field. This study also
expected a general increase in suspicion levels as individuals gain more experience, with the rate
of increase being higher in cyber operators. This may indicate that suspicion is a trainable
attribute and that it can be developed in individuals over time. These increases would yield
useful results for the Air Force throughout their cyber personnel selection process, as they would
allow the measurement of suspicion to be adjusted regarding a person’s age and background.
1.7 Methodology Overview
Multiple measurement methods provided a basis for data collection within this thesis to
include a demographics questionnaire, a Suspicion Propensity Index, trust assessment, and mission
scenario questionnaire. The demographics questionnaire was administered to gather pre-survey
10

information about the participants. Next, an eleven-item Suspicion Propensity Index (Bobko et al.,
n.d.) was given to measure the components of each individual’s level of suspicion, including that
of cyber operators and non-cyber operators. Trust was assessed through an eight-item survey
designed to measure both trust and distrust (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Perfomance at
various cyber operations was measured through a six-item survey, referred to as the Mission
Performance Questionnaire, in which different scenarios were presented to the participants and
they were instructed to choose the best response to each case. A total of 122 individuals
participated in this research, including 57 from the cyber career field and 65 from career fields
other than cyber. Data was analyzed using multiple techniques to include simple linear regression,
T-tests, correlation tables, and multiple linear regression.
1.8 Assumptions/Limitations
The current research is not intended to develop an all-encompassing personnel selection
tool, but rather to consider whether suspicion as a trait attribute may be one of multiple useful
criteria useful in the development of such a tool. It is recognized that other influences, such as an
individual’s preemptive interest in cyberspace operations, aptitude in the computer science realm,
greater interest in other career fields, etc. may be more important than suspicion when selecting
individuals for participation in the cyberspace career field.
A potential limitation of this study is not having access to the individuals who are currently
undergoing cyber training, as a way to measure preliminary suspicion and success throughout the
preliminary training courses for the career field. Additional information that would be helpful but
was not available is access to the individuals who did not successfully complete cyber training,
including students who have failed the preliminary courses or withdrew from the career field for
lack of the necessary skills to perform the necessary operations within the field. These individuals
11

could provide insight into personality types and suspicion propensity for unsuccessful career field
candidates. However, due to the Privacy Act of 1974, the personal information for these individuals
is protected which currently limits our ability to track individuals through the training process.
An additional limitation of this study arises from the sample of individuals participating in
the Continuing Education Cyber courses at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. It is a possibility that
these individuals are not representative of the career field at large, resulting in a sampling bias.
Due to the voluntary nature of the survey, it is also possible that only certain types of individuals
participated in the study. This possibility also holds true for the non-cyber participants, as the
surveys were also administered on a voluntary basis.
1.9 Implications
If this research helps in the assessment of attributions correlated with successful airmen as
cyberspace operators, it has the potential to reduce the cost and effort spent to train ill-equipped
airmen who wish to enter the career field. With the current lack of a screening examination for the
career field, many airmen are being assigned to cyber even though they may not have the
knowledge or propensity for success in the current training program or the field. With the help of
the SPI and other research on what makes a cyberspace airman effective, the Air Force should be
able to select men and women who are more predisposed to success. This will decrease the chance
that these men and women will wash-out of the training program, allowing these individuals to
flourish in other fields. It will also allow for more focus and higher quality training for the
individuals who do participate in the field’s training program, leading to more knowledgeable and
informed cyberspace airmen. This has great potential to eventually enhance the innovative
techniques and improve our success against the nation’s enemies. Lower washout rates amongst
cyber training will also yield great savings in both time and money for the DoD as a whole.
12

In the human factors and psychology academic fields of study, this research could provide
extremely insightful information on an important topic that currently has received limited research.
The element of suspicion is an important topic as it plays a role in everyday life at both the
individual and organizational level. By further exploring this topic, many opportunities could be
created to provide insight into how humans interact with one another and with machines. Insight
on suspicion has the potential to both explain and expand upon already existing theories in
psychology, sociology, and other social sciences. Having such insights can improve organizational
behavior through an understanding of suspicion, along with how these suspicion levels may be
influenced under certain circumstances.

13

II. Literature Review
2.1 Literature-Based Construct of Suspicion
The topic of suspicion is one that is relevant in many fields and its use in systems
involving human-automation teams is likely to increase with growing dependence on automated
systems in today’s society. Although little investigation has been conducted in the past regarding
the causes of suspicion and its effects on human interactions, scientists have recently attempted
to uncover what suspicion really means and how it develops as a trait.
In the existing literature, suspicion has been studied as a relevant domain in social
psychology, management and communication, marketing, and human factors psychology
(Khazon, 2016). In social psychology, suspicion is defined as “a dynamic state in which the
individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motive or
genuineness of a person’s behavior” (Fein, 1996). In communications and management
literature, it is defined as “the degree to which a person is uncertain about the honesty of some
specific communication content thereby stimulating a construal of motives in an effort to assess
potential deceptive intent” (Kim & Levine, 2011). While different fields view suspicion through
vastly different lenses, the literature has many common themes while describing the attribute that
must be discussed.
2.1.1 Uncertainty. First, suspicion stems from a sense of uncertainty. Uncertainty occurs
when an operator does not have enough information regarding a target to foresee a future action.
The presence of uncertainty has been commonly studied in negotiation strategies, persuasive
tactics, and in managerial positions. A common theme of these studies involves suspension of
judgement and delayed decisions due to doubt one has when interacting with another entity
14

(Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). Uncertainty alone is only one important facet of suspicion and
does not act independently in the characteristic. For example, a person can be uncertain about a
technology or software due to lack of training, but this does not mean that they are necessarily
suspicious of its functionality (Bobko et al., 2014).
2.1.2 Malicious Intent. Malicious intent, often abbreviated to “malintent,” implies some
form of dishonesty or attempt at manipulation by an outside source to harm or degrade the
performance of the operator. An operator experiences malicious intent when they question one’s
motives and perception of interference with their own goals, or cause harm in some other way
(Khazon, 2016). The literature indicates that malicious intent acts in conjunction with uncertainty
when an operator perceives the potential outcome of the uncertain action to have negative
consequences. While it is possible for intent to be cast in a positive light, such as entrepreneurs
taking risks in business ventures, the context of this study focuses on the negative instances that
are associated with suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014).
2.1.3 Cognitive Activity. The final element of the accepted suspicion definition is
cognitive activity. Cognitive activity refers to the mental processing that is required to predict
incentives and future outcomes when dealing with the target. Several literatures have shown that
a state of suspicion is correlated with higher activation levels when processing information,
along with higher levels of engagement and thought processes (Kim & Levine, 2011).
In an attempt to synthesize these commonalities into one generally accepted definition,
Bobko et al. (2014) conducted a study on suspicion in the Information Technology field and
defined state suspicion as “a person’s simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and
perceived malintent about underlying information that is being electronically generated, collated,
15

sent, or implemented by an external agent.” Using the vast amount of research available
regarding trust and distrust through several domains, Bobko et al. (2014) attempted to relate
suspicion to these characteristics and incorporated them into the introduction of a three-stage
model, describing suspicion as a dynamic process. The model attempts to discuss how a person
enters a suspicious state and then predict the immediate outcomes of this suspicion. A graphical
depiction of the model is shown in Figure 2, followed by an in-depth description of each stage.

Figure 2. The 3 stages that encompass a suspicious state, adapted from Bobko et al., (2014).

Stage I. Stage I of Bobko’s three-stage model involves the perception and interpretation
of environmental cues. Cues result in increased levels for uncertainty and malintent through a
violation of the actor’s expectation from a target. The exposure to this violation results in a
16

trigger of state suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014). Environmental cues can have many patterns.
These include the following:
Missing information. It has been shown that humans are wired to trust others in a
community after they have opened up about personal life and revealed private information
(Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2000). Past research has also shown that when subjects perceive that
policies are missing information, they are more likely to suspect that hidden motives are
involved in the policy (Ebenbach & Moore, 2000). When information is absent as opposed to
present, people are more likely to perceive the situation as suspicious.
Patterns of negative discrepancy. When users experience a dissonance between their
expectations of system behavior and the behavior that is actually witnessed, state level suspicion
is more likely to be cued (Bobko et al., 2014). Additionally, as subjects observe failures across a
system, they are less likely to perceive the software as reliable. In the event that the operator
views the system as undependable, they will be less likely to trust the system.
System interface characteristics. Usability characteristics such as video quality and
response time have been found to correlate with increased levels of user trust (Lee & See, 2004).
Situational trust, one of the three layers that compromise an individual’s trust in automated
systems, is described as being dependent upon specific content of an interaction between a user
and a specific system (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). The factors depicted in Figure 3 are those that
impact the development of trust and behavior within a particular situation.
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Figure 3. Influencing factors on situational trust, adapted from Hoff and Bashir (2015).

These factors directly influence one’s interaction with a system and trust levels. When an
individual is uncertain about these factors, suspicion is likely to be impacted.
Stage II. Stage II of the suspicion process model is the filtering stage. During this stage,
the interpretation of environmental cues is influenced by an individual’s characteristics. This
includes one’s prior life experiences, willingness to rely upon automated systems, and cognitive
resources (Bobko et al., 2014). One’s interpretation of environmental cues is also dependent
upon trust propensity, also described as dispositional trust. Dispositional trust is trust that is
independent of the context of a situation or the environment in which an interaction occurs.
Instead, it is built upon individual characteristics that have been formed over a person’s life
through experience and biological influences. The factors that impact dispositional trust are
shown in Figure 4 (Hoff & Bashir, 2015).
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Figure 4. Influencing factors on dispositional trust, adapted from Hoff and Bashir (2015).

Stage III. The final stage of the suspicion process model is the formation and application
of immediate outcomes. Based on the environmental cues and the different ways that individuals
filter these cues in steps I and II, an immediate response is formed. If suspicious, a person will
analyze the information collected and attempt to predict the next likely event that will occur
given their response. This attempt to reduce uncertainty in the situation is thought to be both
arousing and cognitively demanding (Khazon, 2016).
Bobko’s et al. (2014) development of the process of suspicion is an initial leap in the
direction of describing the process humans undergo during the arousal of suspicion. However, it
only addresses state-suspicion and does not reveal the causes and consequences of an individual
becoming suspicious over sustained periods of time. Several studies have shown that humans
have limited mental resources and when participating in mentally stimulating activity, the
activities associated with suspicion pull from the same group of resources. Execution of this
process results in the depletion of mental resources and an overall decrease in performance for
effortful cognitive activities. This includes a decrease in levels of vigilance (Smit, Eling, &
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Coenen, 2004). As described by Bobko et al. (2014), state-suspicion is both mentally stimulating
and demanding. These findings would suggest that a prolonged suspicious state would further
diminish cognitive resources and cause fatigue that prevents the process from being sustained
over time.
2.2 Trust and its Role in Suspicion
Dictionary definitions of trust often include the description of “reliability,” “honesty,”
and “assured anticipation.” In academia, one of the most commonly accepted definitions of trust
is the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective
of the ability to monitor or control that other party”, (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Other
definitions in research add to this definition, including a willingness to depend on others and the
expectation of certain outcomes (Khazon, 2016). The notions of anticipation, expectation, and
predictability are what link trust to suspicion in its definition. As described by Bobko et al.
(2014), when an individual recognizes negative discrepancies and missing information from a
situation, the result will be characterized by an increased rate of information searching, greater
processing of available information, and the formation of plausible hypotheses for the observed
behavior. The process includes actions designed to assist the formation of an expected outcome,
thus increasing the state-like presence of trust and decreasing the suspicion in a situation.
It must be considered that when an individual has had no prior experience with an
individual or cyber environment, he or she does not yet have any credible or meaningful
information regarding that actor (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). As with most decision-making
processes, one forms ideas based upon mental models and a set of rules that assist in the
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development of opinions and beliefs (Falcone, Rino, et al., 2001). Interpretation rules allow
individuals to categorize trust dilemmas and decide which evidence to search for in the
assessment of another actor’s trustworthiness. Action-based rules assist in deciding how to
engage in response to certain interpretations. Initial trust is also believed to be based upon two
interconnected components including one’s willingness to depend and make themselves
vulnerable, referred to as trusting intentions, and one’s perceptions of the other actor’s
competence and integrity, referred to as trusting beliefs (McKnight, Choudhury, Kacmar, 2002).
Each of the aforementioned processes and rules are applied to seek the common goal of gaining
information which is useful in increasing the certainty in a situation, thus impacting suspicion.
While prevalent theories posit that trust and suspicion have an interdependent
relationship, some theories hold that trust, distrust, and suspicion are separate entities (Lyons,
2011). These discrepant explanations of trust are distinguished from suspicion in their lack of
presence of uncertainty. They claim that suspicion involves some ambiguity regarding a target’s
motives or intentions, while trust and distrust are characterized by confident feelings that a target
will behave in a certain manner. A state of suspicion has also been described as “the occurrence
of an event if the disconfirmation of the expectation of the event’s occurrence is preferred to its
conformation and if the expectation of its occurrence leads to behavior which is intended to
reduce its negative motivational consequences” (Deutsch, 1958). In this viewpoint, trust is also
described as the expectation of an occurring event which is perceived to have negative
consequences if the expectation is not confirmed. These definitions separate trust and suspicion
through the knowledge of a particular event, with suspicion being characterized by a lack of
certainty in its occurrence and trust being the state that is achieved once sufficient certainty is
achieved.
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2.3 Cyber Warrior Development and Research
It is no secret that the scope of the cyber career field and its capabilities are expanding
within the United States Air Force and the military at large, as well as practically within all other
government and many commercial enterprises. As the need for cyber defense and the capabilities
of cyber increases, the need for capable personnel continues to expand. This growth includes
large numbers of individuals with education in computer science and computer engineering,
further depleting the available pool of individuals with this educational background. As such
individuals within these disciplines are among the most sought after, resulting in more than one
million unfilled computer science jobs in the United States in 2019 (Full Scale, 2019).
To compensate for the lack of academically trained individuals across the Air Force and
other branches, the DoD has instituted a four-phase model in an attempt to rapidly train and
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maintain a mission capable cyber mission force (CMF). The model is shown in Figure 5 (GAO,
2019).

Figure 5. Cyber Mission Force Training Phase Model

To support robust personnel selection, there is a lack of knowledge regarding which
characteristics are held by successful and competent cyber warriors. The following portion of
this literature review will analyze the purpose of the cyber career field as it currently operates,
along with exploring any underlying characteristics that cyber personnel develop and
demonstrate.
The DoD defines cyberspace as “the domain within the information environment that
consists of the interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures and
resident data. It includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of
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cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through
cyberspace”, (DoD Join publication 3-12 cyberspace operations, 2018). The proliferation of
cyber attacks has posed a growing threat to government entities, business organizations, and
individuals on a national and global level.
With such a broad risk posed from a lack of cyber security, there is a high need for
educated professionals to mitigate these risks. This necessity is compounded by the demand for
professionals capable of performing offensive operations, including techniques that are critical
for modern warfare and superiority. However, there is a major shortage in these professionals
that has led to a “human capital crisis in cybersecurity” (Evans & Reeder, 2010). In 2010, the
founding director the CIA’s Clandestine Information Technology Office, Jim Gosler stated that,
“There are about 1,000 security people in the US who have the specialized security skills to
operate at world-class levels in cyberspace – we need 10,000 to 30,000.” At the time Gosler
made this claim, U.S. Cyber Command was a sub-unified command operating under U.S.
Strategic Command. In May of 2018, Cyber Command was established as a unified combatant
command, CYBERCOM, which was aimed at allowing the department to grow and streamline
operations under a single commander (Lange, 2018). However, the Cyber Mission Force has
only grown to 6,200 members, far below the projected requirement.
With a low retention rate and a clear gap between the need for cyber workers and the
quantity of those in the field, the cyber realm must make the most of the workforce that is
available. While there has been little to no significant research regarding suspicion’s role in the
capabilities of cyber personnel, there has been a growing amount of research in the past years
aiming to uncover other common characteristics that are attributed to workers in numerous cyber
fields. The findings include a mix of technical skills, those that are able to be taught and
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reinforced through curriculum, along with soft skills that cannot be as easily learned such as
communication, the ability to understand policy, and relationship building (Haney & Lutters,
2017).
Research was conducted to examine the personality traits of individuals who entered into
a cybersecurity competition, comparing the competition’s participants to individuals not
employed or involved in cyberspace security. The study found that on a Big Five personality
scale, competitors scored significantly higher in Openness and Agreeableness and significantly
lower in the dimension of Neuroticism (Wee, Bashir, Lambert, & Guo, 2016). High levels of
openness were attributed to high levels of creativity, a drive to tackle unique challenges, and the
ability to think about abstract concepts. High levels of agreeableness are attributed to taking an
interest in other’s opinions of oneself, feeling empathy for others, and finding enjoyment in
assisting others. Low levels of neuroticism are typically attributed to having emotional stability
and the ability to handle stress (Pervin & John, 1999). It is possible that these cyber workers
have a strong ability to think in an abstract manner along with a keen sense for the motives of
others, two attributes that allow them to suspect when certain behavior is being construed. Their
low levels of neuroticism could also allow them to respond to the uncertainty of these threats in a
rapid manner.
In an additional field of study, information technology (IT) professionals working in
security management teams were interviewed to assess their skills, responsibilities, and
characteristics (Botta et al., 2007). The study found that overwhelmingly, those in the workplace
were strongly characterized by three driving characteristics, the first being a strong sense for
inferential analysis. The workers described examples such as having a knack for finding what
crashes a system, explaining why certain technology combinations are successful, resolving
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Internet Protocol address issues, etc. The next characteristic involved pattern recognition. These
descriptions included things such as recognizing anomalies, mentally separating relevant from
irrelevant information, and correctly hypothesizing the presence of malicious intent. The final
driving characteristic is bricolage, otherwise described as constructing infrastructure or ideas
from a diverse range of information. The workers were noted as describing times when they
would test technology and get machines working based on a trial and error method, without a
reasonable explanation as to why certain events were successful. Interviewees repeatedly
claimed that they would “play” with technology and appraise different outcomes to identify
problems.
While the study of suspicion as an attribute of cyber personnel is a topic that is only
beginning to receive attention as an area of interest, the research conducted thus far
overwhelmingly agrees that suspicion is comprised of a sense of uncertainty, the detection of
malicious intent, and increased rates of cognitive activity. Aforementioned studies also conclude
that cybersecurity competitors and IT professionals are often creative and abstract thinkers with
the ability to face challenges as puzzles rather than as stressful hindrances to their performance.
When considering the results of these studies in their entirety, perhaps the findings represent a
cohesive conclusion that illustrates the thought processes of individuals who are highly
competent in cyber operations. When individuals are faced with the presence of missing
information and patterns of negative discrepancy, they must act in a creative manner to identify
the malicious intent behind an action. This creative processing can be the result of enhanced
levels of cognitive activity as the individual interprets cues and information from their
environment. These individuals may act in a manner as not to alleviate stressors but to solve
intriguing problems in hopes of reaping an immediate outcome. These attributes and processes
26

that are present in cyber operators closely align with the development of how an individual
manages a suspicious situation in his or her environment.
2.4 Summary
In consideration of the research regarding human suspicion, this analysis served to review
current knowledge on how suspicion arises and the effects of such suspicion. It first defined the
different facets of suspicion and then the stages which a person goes through to act upon their
suspicion. This paper then reviewed current literature regarding the cyber career field. It talked
about the current state of the Cyber Force in the DoD, to include its major labor shortage. It then
reviewed which attributes have been studied in cyber workers and how these attributes relate
back to the concept of suspicion.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces the methodology and design implemented to address the
previously stated research questions stated in Section 1.4. It provides a description of the surveys
and performance measures that were administered, the environment in which the research was
conducted, and the individuals who participated in this study. This chapter also provides a brief
overview of the Cyber 200 and 300 courses of which a portion of the study’s participants were
students.
3.2 Participants
To gain a preliminary baseline measurement of suspicion levels amongst individuals who
the Air Force categorizes as experts in the cyber career field, the surveys were first administered
to 57 students upon the completion of Cyberspace Professional Continuing Education Courses,
otherwise known as Cyber 200 and 300. The courses occurred in the Air Force Cyberspace
Technical Center of Excellence within the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base. Participants consisted of officer and enlisted active duty personnel all within the
Cyber Professional Workforce. The courses hold a prerequisite of eight career years in the field,
with the students who completed the Suspicion Propensity Index having cyber experience
ranging from 10 to 37 years (M = 22.8, SD = 7.25). Students enrolled in these courses are
deemed highly competent by their career field and must be nominated to partake in this advanced
training based on their abilities. The courses are far beyond introductory level and are held for
top-performing cyber operators in an effort to maintain the expertise and competences necessary
to triumph in future cyberspace conflicts.
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In addition to the collection of baseline measurements from cyber personnel, data was
collected from members of other career fields within the DoD having little to no cyber
experience. These participants included officer and enlisted Air Force at the Air Force Institute
of Technology (AFIT). These non-cyber participants were a mixture of students pursuing
master’s degrees and other certificates offered at the university. The SPI, a trust measurement,
and a Mission Scenario Questionnaire were administered to 65 participants ranging from 1 to 30
years of government work experience (M = 8.93, SD = 8.06).
Prior to beginning data collection, Cohen’s Power Primer (Cohen, 1992) was referenced
to gain an estimate of recommended sample size for statistical relevance. Based on a power =
0.80 and an alpha of 0.05, a necessary sample size of at least 64 was needed for a medium effect.
With a total of 122 total participants (57 cyber and 65 non-cyber), this requirement was met.
3.3 Measures
As it has been proven by past studies, suspicion consists of three major components:
cognitive activity, perception of malicious intent, and uncertainty (Bobko et al., 2014). All three
must be present simultaneously for an individual to experience suspicion; therefore, the measure
of suspicion must be derived through performance and outcome measures. Table 1 depicts the
three measures that were used in this study, along with their number of data points (per
participant), and the scale of each measure. In addition to these measurements, a demographics
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questionnaire was administered to collect characteristics of the participants. The demographics
questionnaire is shown in Appendix A.
Table 1. Measurements Questionnaires

Measurement

Source

Number of

Scale

Items
Trust

Mayer, Davis, &

8

Likert 1-7

44

Likert 1-5

Schoorman, 1995
Suspicion

Bobko et al., 2014

Propensity Index
(SPI)
Mission

Adapted with JSOC 6

Performance

Cyber Special

Questionnaire

Missions Flt/CC

0-6

To conduct the measurement of suspicion levels amongst the subjects, the Suspicion
Propensity Index was administered on a voluntary basis to the Cyber 200 and 300 students, along
with non-cyber participants at the Air Force Institute of Technology. The SPI contained eleven
situation-based items. Each scenario contained four responses with each response coded to
represent one of the following indicators: trust, uncertainty and cognitive activity, paranoia, and
uncertainty and perceived malintent. Each response was individually scored on a scale of one
through five, with one being “not at all accurate” and five being “very accurate.” In total, the
eleven scenarios and four responses per item provided 44 data points per participants. The
Suspicion Propensity Index can be viewed in its entirety in Appendix B.
30

As Bobko et al. (2014) proposed that one’s propensity to trust is a factor of one’s
capacity to become suspicious- and in consideration of the contested research regarding trust’s
relationship to suspicion, trust was the next attribute to be measured amongst the AFIT student
participants. As one of the most highly accepted and utilized questionnaires in academia,
Mayer’s eight-item propensity to trust questionnaire was used for the trust measurement (Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). The eight items of the questionnaire were scored on a scale of
one to seven, with one being “strongly disagree” and seven being “strongly agree.” The
questionnaire can be viewed in its entirety in Appendix C.
In order to measure performance in cyber operations, participants completed a sixscenario questionnaire used to measure general inclinations regarding the recognition and
response to potential cyber threats. The scenarios were adapted from an already-existing set of
training scenarios that are utilized by cyber mission defense teams across Air Education and
Training Command (AETC) bases. The scenarios were provided by the Cyber Special Missions
Flight at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). AETC uses these scenarios are
representative of relevant and current cyber threats, and provide opportunity to assess and train
cyber forces ensuring their continuation of knowledge and training. The scenarios were
contained in a questionnaire containing a description of the situation along with three potential
responses to that situation. While the items were carefully constructed to trigger the participants’
use of judgement, each scenario ultimately had only one correct action response. The
questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix D.
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3.4 Procedure
The primary focus of this research is to investigate how an individual’s capabilities in
cyber operations are affected by her or his propensity for suspicion, along with how suspicion
levels differ amongst individuals with different experience levels and varying career fields. To
capture variety within a sample population of non-cyber individuals, the questionnaire measures
were administered on a voluntary basis to students at the Air Force Institute of Technology,
differing in age and coming from a wide assortment of career and educational fields other than
the cyber career field. The participants first took the demographics questionnaire (Appendix A),
followed by the SPI (Appendix B), trust measurement questionnaire (Appendix C), and mission
scenario questionnaire (Appendix D). While the demographics questionnaire collects information
regarding the background of the participants, their names were not recorded, and their responses
were thus anonymous. The surveys were collected at large from the students to ensure their
anonymity and were scored using a participant identification number.
In order to capture variety within a sample of individuals within the cyber career field,
the questionnaires were administered on an optional basis to students upon completion of the
Cyber 200 and 300 courses, also taking place at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Each
course has a three-week duration and occurs roughly every month. The data was collected from
courses that were conducted between April and October of 2019, and the survey was offered on
the last day of the course upon completion. Overall, 122 individuals participated in the study
from the cyber and non-cyber populations.
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3.5 Analysis Overview
This experiment’s data was analyzed using multiple techniques. First, descriptive statistics
were used to overview basic trends and relationships within the data. A basic Pearson Correlation
table was used to investigate the statistical association between variables to include the perfomance
meausre assessment, total SPI score, total Mayer’s trust quetionnaire score, career (cyber vs. noncyber), years in military service, and the individual entities of the SPI to include trust, cognitive
activitation, paranoia, and uncertainty and malintent. Next, linear regression was performed to
determine the strength of a statistical relationship between SPI scores and mission performance
questionnaire scores (RH-1). To compare the general means of SPI scores for cyber operators and
non-cyber operators (RH-2), a one-sample T-Test was used to explore differences among the two
populations. In order to investigate the relationship between years of experience and SPI scores
(RH-3), a basic Pearson Correlation table was used to correlate the two variables. A general linear
model was also used to observe the effects of the interaction between years of experience and
career on suspicion scores. Finally, to explore the relationship between trust and both suspicion
and cyber performance (RH-4), multiple linear regression was performed to determine the trust
questionnaires’ capacity to predict performance scores, along with multiple linear regression to
determine the combined capacity of trust and SPI scores to predict performance.
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the design and methodology used within this
research. It discussed the distribution of the surveys, the environment in which the surveys were
taken, the participants who completed the surveys, as well as an overview of the Cyber 200 and
300 courses in which a portion of the students were enrolled.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the descriptive and statistical analysis conducted on
the experimental data. It reflects upon the different research questions that encompass the goals
of this study, along with the results of the research conducted.
4.2 Performance Measurement
The performance measurement used in this study, the cyber mission performance
questionnaire, was scored on a scale of 1-6. To verify the validity of the measure, descriptive
statistics were applied along with an independent samples T-Test comparing the scores across
both sample populations. The T-Test displayed in Table 3 reveals that the mean performance
scores of cyber personnel are significantly different than the performance scores among noncyber personnel (p = 0.011) with a mean difference of 2.364. Overall, results across the cyber
participants (M = 5.33) were higher than results across the non-cyber participants (M = 2.97).
Table 2. Performance mean comparison among non-cyber (0) and cyber (1) populations.

34

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95%
Confidence
Interval of the

F
Performance

Sig.
6.691

t

df

.011 -15.136

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

106.776

.000

-2.364

Difference
Lower

Upper

.156 -2.674

-2.054

Score

4.3 Descriptive Statistics & Correlations
For this analysis, all variables were continuous with the exception of “Career,” which
was coded as a categorical dichotomous variable with 0 representing non-cyber personnel and 1
representing cyber personnel. Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the data collected. As
shown in the table, the mean years of service among the cyber personnel was much higher than
that of the non-cyber participants. Both populations display a large standard deviation, indicating
a wide range of years of service among the cyber and non-cyber personnel.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Perf Score

122

1

6

4.07

1.478

SPI Total

122

41

91

64.20

9.432

Trust Total

122

19

42

28.54

5.415

Years in Service Cyber

57

10.00

37.00

22.8070

7.25416

Years in Service Non-Cyber

65

1.00

30.00

8.9308

8.05638

Table 4 displays the correlations among all variables. Among key variable relationships
are years in service and performance (r = 0.558, p < 0.0001), total SPI scores and Mayer’s trust
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scores (r = -0.244, p = 0.007), total SPI scores and performance (r = 0.541, p < 0.0001), and
Mayer’s trust scores and performance (r = -0.313, p < 0.0001). It should also be noted that
certain individual facets of the total SPI score are strongly correlated with performance. These
include paranoia (r = 0.435, p = 0.001) and uncertainty/malintent (r = 0.595, p < 0.0001).
Correlations will be discussed in greater detail throughout the remainder of this chapter.
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Table 4. Correlations for all variables. Values for SPI Total and SPI subscale scores are shown, including the paranoia (PAR),
uncertainty/malintent (UNMI) and cognitive activation (CA) subscale scores.
Mayer’s
Career
Career

Pearson Corr

Yrs in Service
1

Sig.
N

Perf Score

SPI Trust

SPI PAR

.628**

.810**

-.290**

.350**

.609**

.332**

.552**

-.432**

.000

.000

.001

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

1

**

**

**

**

**

**

-.422**

122
**

Yrs. in

Pearson Corr

.628

Service

Sig.

.000

N

122

.558

-.322

.301

SPI UN/MI

.618

SPI CA

.304

SPI Total

.543

Trust Total

.000

.000

.001

.000

.001

.000

.000

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

.810**

.558**

1

-.194*

.435**

.595**

.328**

.541**

-.313**

.032

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Perfor-

Pearson Corr

mance

Sig.

.000

.000

Score

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

SPI

Pearson Corr

-.290**

-.322**

-.194*

1

.015

-.144

-.073

-.128

.488**

Trust

Sig.

.001

.000

.032

.870

.113

.424

.160

.000

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

**

**

**

.015

1

**

**

**

-.144

SPI PAR Pearson Corr

.350

.301

122

.435

Sig.

.000

.001

.000

.870

N

122

122

122

122

122

**

**

**

-.144

**

.595

.678

.625

.000

.000

.000

.114

122

122

122

122

1

**

**

-.267**

.000

.000

.003

Pearson Corr

UN/MI

Sig.

.000

.000

.000

.113

.000

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

.332**

.304**

.328**

-.073

.388**

.508**

1

.848**

-.148

Sig.

.000

.001

.000

.424

.000

.000

.000

.104

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

.552**

.543**

.541**

-.128

.625**

.887**

.848**

1

-.244**

Pearson Corr

.618

.388

SPI

SPI CA

.609

.678

.508

.887

SPI

Pearson Corr

Total

Sig.

.000

.000

.000

.160

.000

.000

.000

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

**

**

**

**

-.144

**

-.148

**

1

-.432

-.422

-.313

.488

Trust

Pearson Corr

Total

Sig.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.114

.003

.104

.007

N

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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-.267

.007

-.244

122

4.4 Suspicion and Performance
To recall from section 1.5.1, RH-1 claims that an individual’s SPI score will be positively
correlated to their mission performance score. Figure 6 displays the distributions of performance
scores among both the cyber and non-cyber populations, indicated by individual scores on the
cyber mission performance questionnaire.

Cyber Mission Performance Score Distributions
14

Frequency

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

Performance Score
Non-Cyber

Cyber

Figure 6. Distribution of performance scores among cyber and non-cyber personnel.

As shown in Table 4, mission performance and SPI score have a correlation of 0.541
(p < 0.0001). To further this analysis, linear regression was performed with SPI score as the
predictor for the dependent variable of mission performance. As shown in Table 3, there was a
large amount of variation between the years in service for the different career field categories.
Further, there was a significant difference in years of service between the career field categories.
Members of the cyber career field averaged 22.81 years of service (SD = 7.25) while non-cyber
individuals averaged 8.93 years of service (SD = 8.1). To ensure that this difference between
populations did not bias the SPI results, the model controlled for years in service prior to
performing the analysis.
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The model summary displays the R and R2 goodness of fit measures for the model,
showing that years of service accounts for 31.2% of the variance in an individual’s performance
score. R2 increases in the second model, which includes SPI score as well as years in service. As
shown, the model which includes the SPI scores accounts for 39.2% of the variance in
performance scores. The change in R2 with the addition of SPI as a predictor amounts to 0.08 (F
(1,119) = 15.76, p < 0.0001) indicating that the models, with and without the SPI, are statistically
different. A T-test conducted on each predictor within the regression model indicated that the
SPI accounted for a statistically significant portion of the variance in the performance score (t
(1,120) = 3.97, p < 0.0001). The coefficients table displays values of the overall regression
equation, with Performance Score = -0.15 + 0.054(Years in Service) + 0.053(SPI Score). The
results displayed in Table 5 indicate that the total SPI score has a significant effect on
performance score after controlling for years in service (p < 0.0001). Both the “Years in
Service” and “SPI Total” variables have a positive influence on the dependent variable
“Performance Score.”
Table 5. SPI as predictor for performance score.
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4.5 Suspicion among Cyber vs Non-Cyber Personnel
Section 1.5.2 states that cyber operators will yield higher SPI scores in comparison to
non-cyber personnel (RH-2). To test this hypothesis, an independent samples T-Test was
performed on the SPI scores of cyber and non-cyber personnel. The mean SPI score for noncyber operators (M = 59.45, SD = 8.06) was lower than the mean SPI score for cyber operators
(M = 69.61, SD = 7.87). Table 6 displays these results, indicating that the means are significantly
different (t (1,120) = 7.029, p < 0.0001).
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Table 6. Cyber and non-cyber SPI scores.
Group Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

SPI Score Non-Cyber

65

59.45

8.058

1.000

SPI Score Cyber

57

69.61

7.871

1.043

Independent Samples Test
Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the

Sig.
(2F
SPI Total

Equal

Sig.

.093

.762

t
-7.029

df

tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Difference Difference

Difference
Lower

Upper

120

.000

-10.168

1.447

-13.032

-7.304

-7.040 118.590

.000

-10.168

1.444

-13.028

-7.308

variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

Figure 7 displays the separate distributions of SPI scores for the cyber and non-cyber
populations. As shown in the distributions, the scores of those in cyber are shifted to the right of
non-cyber personnel SPI scores.

41

Figure 7. Distribution of SPI scores among cyber and non-cyber personnel.

4.6 Effects of Years of Experience
In consideration of section 1.5.3, RH-3 presumes that years of experience will have a
positive correlation to an individual’s SPI score, and that the correlation will be more prominent
among cyber operators than among non-cyber operators. As shown in Table 4, the correlation
between total SPI score and years in service is 0.543, which is significantly greater than zero (p <
0.0001). A general linear model procedure was used to view the effects of both years in service
and career on suspicion scores, along with the effect of their interaction. As shown in Table 7,
the interaction between career and years in service had a significant effect (F (1,118) = 5.92,
MSE = 56.4, p = 0.016) on the dependent variable of SPI total score. Figure 8 provides a visual
depiction of the interaction’s effect, displaying the modeled relationship between total SPI scores
and years in service while moderated by career. Within the interaction plot, non-cyber and cyber
personnel have similar suspicion levels for less years in service. However, as participants gain
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experience, suspicion levels show a greater differentiation between the cyber and non-cyber
sample populations.
Table 7. Interaction between years in service and career on suspicion scores.

43

Figure 8. Model results for the two-way interaction between career and years in service on total SPI scores.

4.7 Trust and Performance
As shown in Table 4, the correlation between Mayer’s trust scale and mission
performance is -0.313, which is again statistically different from zero (p < 0.0001). Linear
regression was performed, investigating the predictive capability of the trust measure on cyber
mission performance. As before, years of service alone accounts for 31.2% of the variance in
performance scores, while a model including years in service and the trust measurement account
for 31.9% of the variance. This change is insignificant (t (1,119) = -1.123, p = 0.264) indicating
that after controlling for years of service, the trust measurement did not have a significant effect
on performance on the cyber mission questionnaire. Results can be observed in Table 8.

44

Table 8. Trust measurement as a predictor for performance.

Multiple linear regression was also performed to observe the explanatory variables of
trust and total SPI score, showing their combined effect at predicting the total mission
performance score after controlling for years of service. Together, trust and suspicion account for
39.8% of the variance within the cyber mission performance questionnaire. The F-test is
significant (p < 0.0001), thus it can be assumed that the model explains significant variance in
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cyber mission performance scores. However, the coefficients table shows that the trust parameter
does not have statistical significance on the model results (t (1,118) = -1.115, p = 0.267). The
results can be observed in Table 9.
Table 9. Predictive capability of the combined effect of trust and suspicion.
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4.8 Summary
This chapter presented the data analysis and results pertaining to relevant research
questions and hypotheses. It covered the statistical tests performed in order to investigate each
hypothesis, along with additional exploratory tests that were conducted.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will first summarize the conducted research, along with the interpretation
and significance of the results. It will then discuss recommendations for action regarding the
findings, along with addressing the potential for future work in this realm of research.
5.2 Evaluation of Research Questions
This section will review the initial research questions and draw conclusions based on the
data analysis.
•

RQ-1: Is an individual’s level of suspicion correlated to his or her success within the
cyberspace career field?

The correlation analysis supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that suspicion and mission
performance have a significant correlation of 0.541. While accounting for differences in years of
service among the two sample populations, the SPI scores accounted for 39.2% of variation within
participants’ mission performance scores. Across both the cyber and non-cyber groups, it can be
concluded that high levels of suspicion are correlated with one’s ability to perform well on the
cyber mission performance questionnaire. However, differences in suspicion scores prove to be
much lower among the two populations for individuals early in their careers and increases
significantly as time within the cyber career field increases. Overall, performance in the cyberspace
career field does have a positive relationship with suspicion, and this relationship becomes
significantly stronger with increased time in the career field.
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•

RQ-2: Do current Air Force cyber operators differ in their levels of suspicion when
compared to members of other career fields?

The total SPI is calculated on a scale of 22 to 110. Participants within the cyber operator sample
population had a mean score of 69.61 versus the non-cyber sample population which had a mean
score of 59.45. This 10.16 point difference indicates that the sample of cyber personnel were
generally more suspicious than the sample of non-cyber personnel. It should not go without
recognition that general increases in suspicion over time prove much more prominent among cyber
personnel than non-cyber personnel. In consideration of Bobko’s Three Stage Model, training has
a large impact on how an individual enters a suspicious state. Within the cyber population alone,
it is possible that the training and experience that operators gain over their career plays a large role
in this increase in suspicion compared to members of other career fields.
•

RQ-3: Does an Airman’s years of experience in their field correlate to significant
differences in levels of suspicion?

The data presumed that for both sample populations, years of experience and suspicion scores have
a significant correlation of 0.543. When observing the effects of career, years of service, and the
interaction of these variables on suspicion, both non-cyber and cyber personnel had similar SPI
scores among participants with lesser years in service. As years in service increased, there was a
greater difference in SPI scores between the non-cyber and cyber sample populations. Cyber
personnel with a large number of years in service were determined to have the highest SPI scores.
It can be concluded that years of experience is positively correlated with levels of suspicion,
indicating that more experienced personnel provide higher SPI scores than less experienced
personnel. Furthermore, while this effect was present for both cyber and non-cyber personnel, the
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effect was much stronger across the cyber personnel. Therefore, SPI scores seem to increase in
conjunction with one’s experience in the cyber career field.
•

RQ-4: Does an Airman’s propensity to trust correlate with both her/his levels of suspicion
and success within the cyberspace career field?

The trust measurement used in this study yielded a significant correlation with cyber mission
performance (r = -0.313, p < 0.0001). Trust also contributed to 31.9% of the variance within
performance scores after controlling for years in service; however, these results do not prove to be
a significant change from the explained variance by years of service alone. These results indicate
that although there is a correlation between an individual’s level of trust and cyber performance,
this relationship is largely due to years in service as opposed to trust as an independent parameter.
Further investigation shows that the trust measurement in conjunction with SPI scores account for
39.8% of variance in performance scores. This is a slight increase from the 39.2% of variance that
is explained by suspicion alone while also controlling for years in service; however, the
contribution made by the trust parameter to this model does not prove to be significant (p = 0.267).
5.3 Significance of Research
The findings within this research have the potential to contribute a noticeable impact on
the cyber career field within the entirety of the Department of Defense. This research is the first
of its kind to consider suspicion as an influencing factor on cyber performance; and opens the
door for additional exploration on the subject matter. Successful members of the cyber career
field demonstrated higher levels of suspicion than their non-cyber counterparts, especially with
increased experience. While the findings on suspicion within this research do not provide the
necessary data to formulate a screening tool into the cyber career field, the results present
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important findings for the career field at large. This increase over time indicates that suspicion
may be a learned attribute and can thus be utilized to train cyber personnel to be more successful
within their career field. If early cyber training focuses on enhancing the suspicion of operators,
these training modifications could accelerate the trend of increasing suspicion, thus improving
the quality of the cyber force.
In addition to contributions in the cyber career field, the findings of this research provide
insights into other academic fields that display a general lack of literature in regard to suspicion
and trust. While it is accepted that both trust and suspicion play a role in the tendencies of groups
and individuals, there have been few findings to prove exactly what these effects may entail or
that discuss the relationship between trust and suspicion. This study investigated the theorized
relationship between trust and suspicion propensity, ultimately showing that the two attributes
display a moderate, yet significant, negative correlation. The significance of this correlation
provides some credibility to the argument that both trust and suspicion are predicting a similar
underlying phenomenon. Furthermore, this thesis showed that suspicion (as measured through
the SPI) is an indicator of performance while trust (as measured with Mayer’s trust measure)
does not provide similar predictability. These findings can provide insight to a field that
currently holds very little research, while also indicating to cyber personnel that suspicion should
be a prioritized aspect of training as opposed to trust. The findings also present an opportunity
for further exploration into the relationship between the attributes of trust and suspicion, along
with their effect on one another, on one’s personality, and performance in different career fields.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
The indications in this research suggest that while variability in cyber performance is
partially explained by operator suspicion, there are still other attributes that contribute to success
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within the career field. These results pose an opportunity for further research into additional
attributes that may affect one’s ability to perform well at various cyber operations. As the
findings presented in this study indicated that suspicion tends to increase cyber performance as
an individual acquires years of experience, a focal point of future research should lie in gaining
an understanding of how suspicion changes over time. The little research on suspicion that has
been conducted in the past indicates that individuals hold a propensity to become suspicious.
However, this study indicates that it is a learned attribute. These conflicting findings present an
opportunity for further investigation among various career fields in order to validate suspicion as
a characteristic that can be learned or that individuals are predisposed to act upon.
A key revelation from these findings includes the potential for suspicion to contribute to
training modifications within the cyber career field. If future research is conducted, it has the
potential to identify how and why operators act upon their suspicions and how these suspicions
become present in certain individuals. If these questions can be answered, they pose a potential
for accelerating the development of suspicion in cyber operators and, in turn, accelerating greater
levels of success within the career field. There is also still room for investigation into the specific
attributes that contribute to initial success in the career field. In regard to the development of a
screening tool for cyber within the Air Force, additional research can be conducted to explore
which characteristics allow airmen to be successful at cyber operations. Potential factors for
investigation include creativity, persistence, general curiosity, detail orientation, and analytical
thinking.
In order to conduct further validation of the recently developed Suspicion Propensity
Index and to answer questions regarding suspicion as an attribute, the SPI can be used to
evaluate individuals undergoing initial cyber training at Keesler Air Force Base in which trainees
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undergo a six-month course to successfully become operators in the cyber field. A great
assessment of the SPI’s predictive ability could include an initial administration of the index
upon the start of cyber training. Following the course’s conclusion, SPI scores could be
compared to individuals’ pass/fail rates, along with instructor ratings of performance. These
results would further indicate suspicion’s relationship with performance in the cyber field,
looking at a new population of individuals just beginning their career.
Outside of the cyber realm, additional research can be conducted exploring the impact of
both trust and suspicion on individuals’ daily lives. While within this study the two attributes
proved to have an inverse relationship, further investigation into the effect of this relationship
would benefit other areas of academia. For example, one could look at suspicion and trust
propensity in terms of their effects on correspondence bias, the formation and maintenance of
personal relationships, workplace interactions, and attributional thinking.
5.5 Summary
In summary, this research is applicable to the large-scale DoD challenge of training
individuals to be successful within the cyber career field. Through the novel investigation of
suspicion as a predictor for improving cyber capabilities, this research provides an initial step to
modifying the training tools utilized by cyber personnel in the Air Force and other branches of
the United States military. While there is still a vast amount of research that should be conducted
to bolster the findings of this thesis, the results have the capacity for a long-term influence on the
cyber career field and military operations at large.
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Appendix A: Demographics Questionnaire
1. Please indicate your age: ______
2. Please indicate your gender: Male ______

Female ______

3. Please answer the following statements regarding your previous education:
a. Highest level of education previously achieved:
High School____ Some College____ Bachelors ____ Master’s ____ Ph.D. ___
b. Previous education major: _________________________________
c. Indicate your GPA for the highest level of education achieved: ______
d. Indicate how many cyber courses have you completed over your academic career
(programming, security, engineering, etc.): ______
4. If currently attending school, please answer the following statements:
a. Indicate the level of education you are currently pursuing:
Certificate____ Masters _____ Ph.D._____ Other (specify): ________________
b. Indicate your current major: _______________________________
c. Indicate your current GPA: ________
d. GRE Score (if applicable): _________
5. Please answer the following statements regarding your work experiences:
a. Indicate your primary career field occupation: _________________________
b. Indicate number of years’ experience in primary career field: __________
6. Please indicate your employment category: Military ______ Civilian ______
a. If military,
i. Indicate your current rank: ________
ii. Indicate total years in service: _______
b. If civilian,
i. Indicate employment sub-category:
Government _____ Contractor ______ Other______
ii. Indicate total years in sub-category: ______
iii. If prior military, indicate number of years in military service: _____
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Appendix B: Suspicion Propensity Index
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your general inclination
towards the others and/or the actions of others.
Instructions: For the following scenarios, please read the description and indicate how accurately
each of the response statements describes you.
Scenario 1.

Not at all
accurate

Minimally
accurate

Somewhat
accurate

Accurate

Very accurate

Not at all
accurate

Minimally
accurate

Somewhat
accurate

Accurate

Very accurate

Imagine you have applied for a job, for which you are
qualified, and have gone through the interview process.
Shortly after the interview, you receive notification that the
company decided to offer the job to another individual.

a. I would decide to move on and continue searching for a
job.
b. I would follow up with someone at the company and
request more information about why I wasn’t chosen.
c. I would be certain that someone I was in contact with
during the process must not like me, and I would do
something like telling others to avoid this company.
d. I would wonder if there was someone at the company who
I had contact with who purposely wanted to keep me from
getting the job.
Scenario 2.
Imagine that you see a discussion on a social networking
website indicating that several of your friends got together this
past weekend, and they didn’t contact you about joining them.

a. I would be certain that my friends purposefully excluded
me, and I would do something such as refuse to continue
socially interacting with them.
b. I would not dwell on it, and instead focus my thoughts on
something else.
c. I would search for more information and reasons as to
why they might have gotten together and not contact me
(such as an invitation by someone I’m not friends with).
d. I would wonder if one of them excluded me on purpose.
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Scenario 3.

Minimally
accurate

Somewhat
accurate

Accurate

Minimally
accurate

Somewhat
accurate

Accurate

with the extra options is a better investment.”

Not at all
accurate

mid-level model, he says, “In the long run, a high-end model

Not at all accurate

showroom. After telling a salesperson you are interested in a

Very accurate

Imagine you are interested in buying a new car and are in a car

a. I would look around and listen to see if other customers
were receiving the same advice from the salespeople.
b. I would wonder if the salesperson was only interested in
the potential increase in the commission from the sale.
c. I would be certain that the salesperson is not truly trying
to help me, and I would do something such as leave and
never return to that dealership.
d. I would accept the help – it’s always nice to have an
expert opinion.

Imagine you enter a contest for a local school’s fundraiser to
guess the number of marbles in a large jar. The prize is a
$100 gift card to a popular online store. After making your
best guess, you find out the following week that you did not
win and that one of the teachers at the school won the contest.
a. I would wonder if the teacher who won had cheated
and/or had gotten inside information on this activity.
b. I would accept another person winning – better luck next
time.
c. I would think about flaws in my own thinking (e.g., flaws
in how I came up with my estimate) that might explain
why I didn’t win.)
d. I would be certain that the contest was rigged, and I would
do something such as never participate in that school’s
fundraisers again.
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Very accurate

Scenario 4.

Accurate

Very accurate

Accurate

Very accurate

before curfew.

Somewhat
accurate

with you when arriving home, and he has never returned home

Somewhat accurate

stopping to talk to you. In the past he always has checked in

Minimally
accurate

hour before curfew and heads straight to his room without

Minimally accurate

Imagine that you have a teenage son. He comes home a half

Not at all accurate

Scenario 5.

a. I would assume he is tired and probably just didn’t feel
like stopping to talk to me.
b. I would wonder what he might be hiding from me. (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and perceived
malintent)
c. I would be certain that he is hiding something from me,
and I would do something such as taking away his driving
privileges without discussing it further with him.
d. I would go to his room and attempt to find out what might
be wrong.
Scenario 6.
Imagine you have just visited an online store to shop for a book

discount website that you haven’t heard of before, you decide to
go ahead and purchase the book. After entering your credit card
information and clicking the “confirm purchase” button, you wait
for an email confirmation of your purchase. However, the email
confirmation never arrives.
a. I would be certain that the lack of email confirmation meant
that I had lost the money, and I would do something such as
immediately cancel my credit card or not shop online in the
future.
b. I would try to email the company to determine if the purchase
was confirmed, and I would attempt to find out more
information about the company.
c. I would wonder if there was any danger in providing my credit
card information.
d. I would wait a few days to see if the confirmation is delivered
as the website promised.
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Not at all accurate

you want to purchase. After finding the book you want on a

Very accurate

Accurate

it.”

Accurate

you ask, your supervisor keeps telling you “we’re working on

Somewhat
accurate

months. After 5 months, you haven’t received a raise. When

Somewhat
accurate

your supervisor that you will receive a raise within the first 3

Minimally
accurate

Imagine you start working for a new company and are told by

Not at all accurate

Scenario 7.

a. I would try to get more information (e.g., Did coworkers
get their raises on time? Is the company doing okay
financially?)
b. I would be certain that my supervisor is trying to avoid
paying me the raise I deserve, and I would do something
such as consider quitting.
c. I would not worry. I was told I would get a raise so one
will happen soon.
d. I would wonder if my supervisor was trying to take
advantage of me.

Scenario 8.

is carrying pamphlets, a clipboard, and a box.
a. I would wonder if the person is there to take advantage of
me in some way.
b. I would be certain that this is a solicitation that I did not
want, and I would do something such as keep quiet and
not even answer the door.
c. I would open the door and invite the person inside my
home.
d. I would answer the door and ask questions to determine
why the person is there.
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Minimally
accurate

peephole in your door. The person, who you don’t recognize,

Not at all
accurate

You aren’t expecting anyone, and you look through the

Very accurate

Imagine one afternoon you are home and your doorbell rings.

Scenario 9.

Accurate

Somewhat
accurate

Minimally
accurate
Minimally

their way to a family member’s funeral.

Not at all
accurate

He tells you his car broke down, and he and his spouse are on

Not at all

gas station. You are approached by a male asking for money.

Very accurate

Imagine you have pulled off an interstate to stop for gas at a

a. I would look to see if I have any money I could spare.
b. I would be certain that this person is conning me, and I
would do something such as call the police or quickly
walk away from him.
c. I would wonder if the person is lying to take advantage of
me.
d. I would ask him questions to try to determine if his story
was accurate or what it might really be.
Scenario 10.

a. I would be certain that there is something very wrong, and
I would do something such as immediately shut the
computer down without completing my search.
b. I would worry that someone is trying to hack into my
computer to cause me harm.
c. I would keep working on the search – it’s likely nothing to
be concerned about.
d. I would try to think of reasons the computer could be
running slow.
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Accurate

accurate

Somewhat

slower than normal.

accurate

of interest. You soon notice that your computer is running

Very accurate

Imagine you are using your computer for a search on a topic

Scenario 11.

a. After counting my change, I would wonder if the error
was made on purpose
b. I would not count my change, and I would put it away
without a second thought.
c. After counting my change, I would think about
possible reasons that I did not get what I expected to
get.
d. Before even looking at my change, I would be certain
that it was wrong and that the attendant is like all
cashiers – who always try to short-change customers –
and I would immediately count my change in front of
him.
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Accurate

Somewhat
accurate

and a $1 bill in return.

Minimally
accurate

$30 in cash to the attendant. He gives you 43 cents, a $5 bill,

Not at all
accurate

your bill. The charge for your items is $20.57, and you give

Very accurate

Imagine you are at a convenience store and you need to pay

Appendix C: Personality Questionnaire
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your general inclination
towards the others and/or the actions of others.
Instructions: Read each of the following statements carefully and circle the number that best
describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the 7-point scale provided
below.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Neutral

5
Slightly
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7

1. Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.
1

2

3

4

5

2. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

5

6

7

3. Most adults are competent at their jobs.
1

2

3

4. Most salespeople are honest in describing their products.
1

2

3

4

5. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
1

2

3

4

6. These days, you must be alert, or someone is likely to take advantage of you.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

7. One should be very cautious with strangers.
1

2

3

4

8. Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty
1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Appendix D: Mission Scenario Questionnaire
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your perception of the
described mission scenarios.
Instructions: For the following scenarios, please read the description and select the response
which most closely aligns with the action(s) you would take.
1. Scenario: After signing into your work computer one morning, you observe an unexpected
software installation. Not thinking much of the software, you begin to read your work emails
when you notice that the software is attempting to access your computer’s microphone and
webcam.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. Continue working on your computer, paying extra attention to any irregular activity that
may further indicate the presence of a hacker.
B. Immediately power down your computer, the hacker cannot persist if the processor is not
turned on.
C. Leave your computer running and immediately report the incident to your office’s security
manager.
2. Scenario: You are an RPA pilot conducting a mission that has been extended due to
unforeseen circumstances. With extremely low fuel levels, you now have to stop at a nearby base
to refuel in order to conduct the extended mission. However, the shortest route to the base is
programmed to fly through Iranian airspace.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. Divert the drone to land in an unsecure airfield in Afghanistan where US forces are
present, but there may be unknown threats
B. Fly the drone on the shortest route possible, which happens to be contested airspace which
Iran has recently claimed as their own.
C. Crash land the drone in the Arabian gulf and send US Naval troops to recover the aircraft
(ensure destruction). This will result in a loss of the US asset would prevent it from falling
into the hands of the enemy.
3. Scenario: Imagine you are a cyber operator monitoring the communications and weapons
systems on an F-22 mission. Shortly after refueling at a friendly base, you observe traffic on the
aircraft’s mission systems that deviate substantially from its known baseline. This indicates the
potential for onboard systems being compromised.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. Shut down communication with the aircraft. This will ensure that adversary forces can no
longer listen to information regarding the mission, however, it will also cut coordination
with the F-22.
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B. Continue to monitor the network traffic and instruct the F-22 to continue its mission as
planned.
C. Abort the mission and instruct the F-22 to land at the nearest base.
4. Scenario: You are the ranking officer on a logistics convoy in a combat zone. You have
received intelligence from one of the locals working on the base that ISIS has intercepted
communications (mission details) regarding the convoy from one of the troops’ cell phones.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. Continue on predetermined patrol (mission as planned) with increased security along
route.
B. Ensure all airmen turn off their cellphones. Reschedule the mission for a different time
along a different route, which will allow for 80% completion of the original mission
C. Cancel the mission altogether.
5. Scenario: You are an offensive Cyber Operator and are aiming to investigate the Chinese
militarization of the South China Sea. You successfully infiltrate a Chinese Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAM) System and realize they are currently targeting an allied vessel in the region.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. You continue to monitor the Chinese activity, collecting intelligence while remaining
undercover in the system.
B. You attempt to disable the system. This will protect the allied vessel from a potential
attack but will also reveal your presence to the Chinese in the intelligence system.
C. You stop monitoring the intelligence systems and inform the allied vessel of the potential
threat.
6. Scenario: You are a Cyber Operations Officer supporting an intelligence gathering mission
targeting a Chinese Nuclear Enrichment Facility. While attempting to infiltrate potentially useful
intelligence, you realize that your network traffic has been identified by Chinese cyber security
protocols.
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below:
A. Do your best to infiltrate as much information as possible before enemy forces eliminate
you from the network.
B. Immediately stop transmitting. Passively monitor the network traffic until you believe it
is safe to transmit the remaining intelligence.
C. Stop transmitting and remove any attributable data so that your exploitation methods
could be preserved for future missions.
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